A new maximal theorem for L S -majorized correspondences in noncompact spaces is presented and applied to obtain an equilibrium existence theorem for noncompact abstract economies.
Introduction
The existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium for a normal form game was proved by Nash (1951) . The notion of an abstract economy (social system) was introduced by Debreu (1952) which contains the normal game form as a special case and proved the existence of an equilibrium. The equilibrium result of Debreu not only provides as a corollary the Nash existence theorem, but it was also the instrument used by Arrow-Debreu (1954) to prove the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium. The Debreu theorem was generalized by Shafer-Sonnenschein (S-S) and Borglin-Keiding (B-K) to allow for preferences which need not be representable by utility functions. All the above results are for finite dimensions and do not allow for an infinite number of agents. Most importantly however, as was remarked by Yannelis-Prabhakar (Y-P), the proofs of S-S and B-K fail in the presence of an infinite number of commodities or an infinite number of agents, and new arguments are required. To this end not only were new mathematical results proved in Y-P, but also a new class of correspondences was introduced called L-class.
In this paper, we extend the L-class further and provide new results on maximal elements and equilibrium by dispensing with the assumption of compact strategy sets which generalizes the results in Y-P. We mention that such attempts were made by Yannelis (1985) for maximal elements over noncompact subsets of linear topological spaces.
The corresponding results of Fan (1962), Borglin and Keiding (1976) , Yannelis and Prabhakar (1983) , Yannelis (1985) , Chang (1989) (1990) , Kim (1992) , Ding and Tan (1993) , Yuan and Tarafdar (1996) , and Ding and Yuan (1998) are generalized by our results. denote the closure and interior of the set A.
Let I be a (possibly uncountable) set. For each agent i ∈ I, let its choice set or strategy set X i be a nonempty set in a topological vector space. Let X = j∈I X j . Following Gale and Mas-Colell [9] , Γ = (X i , P i ) i∈I is a qualitative game if for each player i ∈ I, X i is the strategy set of player i, and
Xi is a preference correspondence of player i which is irreflexive [i.e. π i (x) / ∈ P i (x) for each x ∈ X]; also, a pointx ∈ X is said to be an equilibrium point of the game Γ = (X i , P i ) i∈I if P i (x) = ∅ for each i ∈ I. A generalized model is as follows: Definition 1. Let I denote the set of agents. For each i ∈ I, let X i be a nonempty set and X = j∈I X j . Following Ding et al. [6] , an abstract economy
Xi are feasible correspondences of agent i and
Xi are preference correspondences of agent i. An equilibrium point for G is anx ∈ X wherex = (x i ) satisfies
for each i ∈ I. When A i = B i for each i ∈ I our definition coincides with the standard definition, e.g. in Borglin and Keiding [2] or in Yannelis and Prabhakar [13] . Definition 2. Let X be a topological space, Y a nonempty subset of a vector space E, θ : X → E a map and φ : X → 2 Y a correspondence. The following notions were introduced in [2] , [6] - [10] , [12] - [15] :
, and φ has compactly open lower sections in X.
In this paper, we deal mainly with the case (I) X = Y which is a nonempty convex subset of the topological vector space E and θ = I X , the identity map on X, or the case (II) X = i∈I X i and θ = π j : X → X j is the projection of X onto X j and Y = X j is a nonempty convex subset of a topological vector space. In both cases (I) and (II), we write L S in place of L θ,S .
The existence of maximal elements in noncompact spaces
Let X be a nonempty subset of a topological space and U be a preference correspondence on X, that is, for each x ∈ X associates a set U (x) ⊂ X, which may be interpreted as the set of those objects in X that are "better", "larger" or "after"
Theorem 5.1 of Yannelis and Prabhakar [14] is needed in order to prove the existence of maximal elements in noncompact spaces. This is given below in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Let X be a compact convex set in a Hausdorff topological vector space and let U : X → 2
X satisfy the following conditions:
Then {x ∈ X | U (x) = ∅} is nonempty and compact.
The following result is a new theorem for the existence of maximal elements for L S -majorized correspondences in noncompact spaces.
Theorem 2. Let X be a convex subset of a Hausdorff topological vector space E and let
X be everywhere L S -majorized. Suppose there exists a compact set L of X such that for each finite subset S of X, there is a compact convex set K containing S and satisfying
∈ coP 1 (x ) and (2) for each y ∈ X, P −1
According to the hypothesis, there is a compact convex subset K containing
∈ coP 2 (x ) and (2) for each y ∈ X, P −1
Then (1) for each x ∈ X , U(x ) ⊂ P (x ), x / ∈ coP (x ) and (2) for each y ∈ X, P −1 (y) is compactly open in X . Furthermore, for each x ∈ L, P (x) = P 1 (x) and hence by ( * ) for each x ∈ L,
and hence by ( * * ), x 0 ∈ L. This contradicts ( * * * ), therefore there is x ∈ L such that U (x) = ∅.
Corollary 1. Let X be a convex subset of a Hausdorff topological vector space E and let U : X → 2 X be everywhere L S -majorized. Suppose there exists a compact set L and a compact convex set
Then {x ∈ X | U (x) = ∅} is a nonempty subset of L. [14] from compact spaces to noncompact spaces. It also extends Theorem 1 of Kim [10] from intersecting one fixed point to intersecting some compact convex set, and it extends Theorem 1 of Ding and Tan [7] and Theorem 2.3 of Ding and Yuan [8] from paracompact spaces to noncompact spaces.
Remark 1. Corollary 1 is an extension of Corollary 5.1 of Yannelis and Prabhakar

Equilibria of the generalized game
For an application of Theorem 2, we prove the following existence theorem of equilibrium for an abstract economy with an infinite number of agents in noncompact topological vector spaces. 
Xi has locally compactly open lower sections in i and is
Moreover, for each finite set S ⊂ X, there exists a compact convex set K = i∈I K i containing S such that for each i ∈ I:
Then an equilibrium point for the game exists.
otherwise.
Fix i and x ∈ i where (P
There exists an open neighborhood N x of x and a correspondence ψ 
∈ coT x (x ) and (2) for each y ∈ X, T −1
Moreover, for each finite set S ⊂ X there exists a compact convex set K = i∈I K i containing S such that for each i ∈ I:
Corollary 2. Let X = i∈I X i and (X i , A i , B i , P i ) i∈I be an abstract economy. Suppose the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) X i is a nonempty convex subset of a Hausdorff topological vector space E i for each i ∈ I; (2) for each x ∈ X, A i (x) is nonempty and
Xi has compactly open lower sections for each i ∈ I; (5) and (6) in Corollary 2 improve the relative assumptions in Theorem 4 of Ding and Tan [7] , Theorem 3.5 of Ding and Yuan [8] , and Theorem 2.3 of Yuan and Tarafdar [16] . Also assumption (7) in Corollary 2 generalizes these theorems without paracompactness or one-point intersection.
In Corollary 2, let A i (x) = B i (x) = X i for each x ∈ X. Then we have the following: Corollary 3. Let X = i∈I X i and (X i , P i ) i∈I be a qualitative game. Suppose the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) X i is a nonempty convex subset of a Hausdorff topological vector space E i for each i ∈ I;
Xi is L S -majorized for each i ∈ I; (3) i∈I {x ∈ X | P i (x) = ∅} = i∈I cl{x ∈ X | P i (x) = ∅}; (4) there exist a nonempty compact convex subset K 0 of X and a nonempty compact subset D of X such that for each y ∈ X/D there is an x ∈ co(K 0 ∪ {y}) with x i ∈ co(P i (y)) for all i ∈ I. Then an equilibrium point for the game exists.
Let Γ = {N, (X i ) i∈N , (p i ) i∈N } be an n-person game in normal form, where N = {1, 2, · · · , n} is the set of agents, X i is a nonempty compact convex subset of a Hausdorff topological vector space, X i is the set of strategies of the ith agent, p i is a function from the product X = i∈N X i into the real numbers R, and p i represents the utility (payoff or cost) function of ith agent. For each i, let X −i = j =i X j . For x ∈ X and i ∈ N , x = (x i , x −i ). We say that a vector x is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium if, for each i ∈ N, x i ∈ X i and for each t ∈ X i ,
For each i, define a correspondence P i : X → 2
Xi by P i (x) = {y i ∈ X i | p i (y i , x −i ) < p i (x)}. If p i (., x −i ) is quasiconvex on X i , then P i (x) is convex and x i / ∈ P i (x) for all x ∈ X. If p i is continuous, then P i has an open graph. Thus we can replace preference correspondences {P i } i∈N in Corollary 3 by cost functions {p i } i∈N and have the following: Then the game admits a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
